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A mostly grounded clear semantic model of conscious reality

On the previous page, I introduced the concept of clear semantic modelling. On this page, I detail a mostly grounded clear semantic model of conscious reality. I note where the model is, and could further be, theoretically extended, and the various possibilities for that theoretical extension. On the next page, I analyse this semantic model for conformance with my criteria for clear semantic models.

A terminological aside

This model makes use of the concepts of "representation" and "terminality". A representation is that which stands in for something else. A terminal is that which does not stand in for something else but is instead an end in itself. These concepts are inversely correlated along an axis: the more representational a thing is, the less terminal it is.

The core grounded concept from our personal reality is consciousness as the raw actualised capacity for experience and volition from a subjective perspective. Consciousness in these terms is the property of "that which peers out and pokes" at reality from its subjective perspective (the subject of consciousness, also known as the conscious subject, the subject of experience, the subject, the experient, or just the self). The subject is primary and simple; an undifferentiated unity. It has the (actualised) capacity for experience and volition, and is predicated upon experience and volition, but at this basic level we do not associate any particular (volitional) experience(s) with it.

🔗Why do I define the subject of consciousness as "undifferentiated"? Could it not be differentiated? I define it this way because the essence of the meaning of "consciousness" is "being conscious". If the subject of consciousness is differentiated, then the question might be posed: which differentiated part is conscious? Since this question does not, it seems to me, have a satisfactory answer, it is best to remove the possibility of differentiation from the fundamental definition of the subject of consciousness.

Around the core of the subject of consciousness itself, we can introspect various components of experienced reality. The most immediate is the affective component of experience: that which it feels to be conscious, including our emotional experiences. Beyond the affective component of experience is the somatic component of experience. This comprises our experiences of our bodies, with which we identify - though not as intimately as we identify with our subjective consciousness itself.

Beyond the somatic component of experience is the sensory-perceptual component of experience. This is a representational component: it represents that which appears to be a reality "beyond" us; a reality with which we do not personally identify. My sensory-perceptual experiences are experiences "of" the empirical world beyond me, whether that be of the way that the empirical world looks, sounds, tastes, smells, or feels, or of any other quality of that world. They represent the empirical world.

Beyond the sensory-perceptual component of experience is the cognitive component of experience. This consists in my thinking experiences. As with sensory-perceptual experiences, my cognitive experiences are representational; my thoughts are "about" the empirical or conceptual worlds. They represent the empirical or conceptual worlds.

Affective experiences (emotions and feelings) are terminal rather than representational: to the extent that they can be said to represent anything at all, they are self-representative only. Although I might be happy about something that happened, that "aboutness" is not representational but referential. Too, I might anyway just as well be happy about nothing in particular.

Somatic experiences seem to be a mixture of terminality and representativity insofar as they consist in a middle ground between that with which we identify so tightly as to "be" us - that undifferentiated unity which "peers out and pokes" at reality - and that with which we do not identify at all - the world beyond our bodies.

One axis of reality - of my experience - then, is that of terminality-representativity: generally, the more terminal an experience is, the more I identify with it as my self; the more representational, the less I identify with it as my self. It is not only experiences with which I identify though: I also identify more or less with that component of myself which experiences. In the case of somatic experiences, that which experiences is my body. In the case of cognitive experiences, that which experiences is my mind. In the case of affective experiences, that which experiences is an even more central aspect of my being than either body or mind; closer to consciousness itself. In this context, I introduce the notion of the axis of selfhood as that axis along which I identify more or less with my experiences and with that which experiences them. Although different people might order the components of selfhood differently, for me, the ordering along this axis from that with which I identify most to that with which I identify least goes something like this:

Now, given that the subject of consciousness "peers out and pokes" from a subjective perspective, I conceptualise each person - a human being, an animal, a plant, a microbe, etc - as, in essence, a portal through which the subject of consciousness "peers out and pokes" at reality. I conceptualise this portal then as the origin of the axis of selfhood: it is the point at which I most self-identify.

🔗 Unless I adopt solipsism proper, then there really is a world beyond my body which is represented by my representational experiences, and there really are other selves who also have representational sensory-perceptual experiences which also represent this same reality which also is beyond themselves. I do not adopt solipsism proper: this is the only theoretical leap made in this semantic model; otherwise the model is grounded. How do I justify this theoretical leap? Solipsism is probably false in that if it were true, I would probably have no limitations on the exercise of my will, nor experiences of that with which I do not consciously identify, but neither of these are the case.

A second axis (set of axes), actually a set of dimensions (see the previous page for the distinction), is that within which the portals exist in relation to one another, the inter-self relational dimensions. In conventional terms, this is "the world out there"; empirical reality; the physical world.

Thus, we have two axis systems: one single, grounded axis of selfhood, and one theoretical (on the theory that solipsism is false) set of dimensions relating selves to one another, the inter-self relational dimensions.

Too, each component of experience, and, as applicable, that which it represents, consists in some sort of energy, or, in other words, some sort of "stuff".

Now, a question might be posed at this point: I am not only conscious that I am conscious, but I can also think about being conscious (and about being conscious of being conscious, etc): what does this imply about both consciousness proper and the energy of the components of experience through which the subject of consciousness "peers out and pokes"? It might seem from the preceding analysis that consciousness and experience are utterly divorced, and I might then wonder how I could be conscious of being conscious via my experience, which (my experience) seems otherwise by the above analysis to be empty of consciousness.

One way to answer this question is to suggest that consciousness itself is like a light that shines on and through experience, illuminating it in a way which is self-reflective. In this way, consciousness and its subject "perceive themselves" through the subject's experiential layers. This implies that its experiential layers are in the first place capable of perceiving (reflecting / responding to) consciousness, and thus that they, in some sense, have properties of consciousness themselves.

I define, then, the reflectivity of energy as its capacity to "recognise" the light of consciousness.

Prior to that, I define the mentality of energy as the extent to which it supports experience. Thus, energy being reflective implies that that energy is mental.

🔗At this point, a few explicit definitions are useful:

The subject of consciousness, the conscious subject, the subject of experience, the subject, the experient, or just the self
That undifferentiated unity which has the (actualised) capacity for consciousness, experience, and volition, and which "peers out and pokes" at reality from its subjective perspective. It is the origin of the axis of selfhood.
Consciousness
The "light" which shines through each portal of conscious reality as a property of the subject at the origin of each portal, and upon which the capacity of that subject for experience is predicated. (Note, though, that if I refer to "a" consciousness, then I mean a conscious subject).
Experience
That which "occurs to" or "is had by" the subject of consciousness per its consciousness. The more terminal an experience is, and the less representational, the more I personally identify it as myself. Experiences are comprised of energy. Experience occurs in mental energy. Self-conscious experiences are possible when the mental energy in which experience occurs is also reflective.
Mind
In the narrow sense (the cognitive mind): consciousness itself plus the cognitive component of experience. In the broader sense (the conscious mind): consciousness itself plus all of its components of experience, from affective experiences to somatic, sensory-perceptual, and cognitive.

The notions of mentality and reflectivity have interesting implications for artificial consciousness. Humans could only design and build an artificial consciousness in that energy of reality which has sufficient mentality (as opposed to building a merely artificial intelligence, which in a limited rather than general sense has already been done). If, theoretically, "physical" matter is intrinsically and utterly non-mental, then it might not be possible to artificially open a portal in physical reality through which consciousness can look out and experience. If, theoretically, "physical" matter is intrinsically non-reflective, then, even if it is possible to artificially open such a portal, it might not be possible for self-consciousness to arise through that portal; that is, for the self at the core of that portal to be conscious that it is conscious through its experiences.

I qualify with "might" because it is possible that, somehow, energy which is mental or reflective could be associated with artificial portals even if "physical" matter were non-mental and non-reflective.

On the theory of non-reflective but mental "physical" matter, would it, though, be possible to open up a portal of non-self-aware consciousness; in other words, of a subject of consciousness which cannot reflect on its own consciousness? It is hard from our self-aware perspective to imagine this possibility, but it might be a coherent one: one in which the light of consciousness shines and experiences are had which are not self-aware.

This, though, would be an untestable possibility: to the extent that a non-self-aware entity could communicate with us, it would not be able to communicate any evidence of its consciousness, since it would not have any awareness of its own consciousness.

I derive from this model that on the conventional understanding of digital electronic systems such as computers, there is no possibility for self-aware subjects of consciousness to arise: the deterministic laws by which these systems operate allow no room for either mentality or reflectivity; for the recognition of the light of consciousness. This applies to any strictly deterministic system, including strictly non-mental deterministic systems: in such a system, there is no room for the recognition of consciousness; there are only non-conscious processes which cannot connect with or reflect consciousness. We would need a new conception of matter to allow for that possibility.

🔗So far, I have taken the subject of consciousness to be a raw fact; to be that undifferentiated unity which peers out and pokes at reality through portals (and potentially in general too). The question arises: is there more than one such subject of consciousness, or is there only one? In the latter case, the unitary subject would be peering out and poking from a multitude of portals simultaneously. Whilst this would be a strange and mind-bending thought, it would not, it seems to me, be strictly incoherent. [Update of 28 August 2019: Having discussed and considered this notion more carefully, I am far less convinced that it is, after all, a coherent one. It is very likely, in my view, incoherent, in the sense that I would now very likely endorse the following contention: "Necessarily, the identity of each self is in a one-to-one correspondence with the identity of a singular stream of phenomenal experience".]

This semantic model and its implications could be elaborated in further detail, but because this page is an introduction, I leave it there. On the next page, I analyse it for conformance with the criteria for clear-thinking semantic models.

Changelog (most recent first)

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