A series on clear semantic modelling, ontology, idealism, and dualism

This series evolved out of an intellectual itch that I needed to scratch. I had for some years been gripped - on and off, but, in the weeks during which this series was written, very much "on" - by the need to get to the bottom of my reservations about idealism as Bernardo Kastrup presents it in his book Why Materialism Is Baloney. I had previously drafted and privately shared around attempts at critique which I ultimately found unsatisfactory, and which I held back from publishing.

His ideas seemed in a sense incoherent to me, but I struggled to pin down in rigorous terms exactly why and how. Eventually, I developed a couple of analytical arguments against idealism, but found in the end that they seemed to miss the mark: I came to see that they were unsound. Still, I had this sense of incoherence. I still hadn't gotten to the bottom of it! My mind continued to seek clarity.

I started thinking about what, ultimately, was the essential nature of Bernardo's ideas, and I came to the conclusion that they are a "semantic model" of reality. In realising that I was seeking clarity, I came to the conclusion that philosophy simply is clear thinking about reality (and about our place in it, and about how we should behave in it), and, in this context, I decided that if a semantic model is to be useful, it must consist in clear thinking.

To this end, I developed a set of criteria for a clear semantic model. I introduced these criteria in context, along with some additional definitions of terms, on the first page in this series.

I then delved into ontology by offering my own semantic model of conscious reality which could help me to identify why I struggled to make sense of Bernardo's model, and, following that, I assessed my model for conformance with my criteria for clarity.

Next, I assessed various common ontologies in the light of my model.

I was now in a good position to return to that which provoked this series in the first place: the ideas in Bernardo Kastrup's book Why Materialism Is Baloney. In analysing his ideas, I identified four apparent contradictions, which I was initially able to resolve with reference to my own model, however, I then found that one of them returned in a new form which I was unable to resolve.

This, then, led me to develop a rigorous argument against idealism which I term "The argument against idealism from conflicting perspectives".

At the end of that argument, I suggest how Bernardo's idealism might be minimally adjusted to fix the problem identified by my argument, and on the subsequent page, I elaborate on one solution. I then propose a further fix to arrive at a theoretical dualistic model of conscious reality.

The series ends with the two failed arguments against idealism that I initially attempted, with contextualising comments to indicate that and why they fail.

1. An introduction to clear semantic modelling
   

   Clear semantic models are models of meaning which make use of syntactical elements - words or other symbols - in order to clearly express a key concept via a coherent set of component concepts and the relationships between them.

2. A mostly grounded clear semantic model of conscious reality
   

   Consciousness as an actualised capacity for volitional experience illuminates reality through subjective portals.

3. Assessment of a mostly grounded semantic model of conscious reality for conformance with the criteria for clarity
   

   The model meets the criteria of semantic and conceptual clarity, and representational accuracy, and thus is a clear one.

4. Contextualising common ontologies from the perspective of a mostly grounded consciousness-based semantic model
   

   Physicalism incoherently denies either the light of consciousness or the direction of its shine; micro-pansychism theorises unparsimoniously that each element of matter is a portal; idealism and cosmopsychism theorise that all energy has mentality and, potentially, reflectivity; and dualism theorises that only the mind has mentality.

5. An analysis of Bernardo Kastrup's semantic model of Analytic Idealism
   

   Analytic Idealism as presented by Bernardo Kastrup seems to suffer from an unresolvable paradox despite my best attempts to resolve it.

6. The argument against Analytic Idealism from conflicting perspectives
   

   Bernardo Kastrup's Analytic Idealism is not an accurate model of reality because it entails a contradiction: that the subject of experience which is the universal mind experiences from multiple conflicting perspectives simultaneously, whereas essential to the definition of perspective is that it has a singular identity.

7. Idealism as a network of minds
   

   It does not seem possible to falsify a conception of idealism with a Source mind as "server" and individual minds as "clients".

8. A theoretical dualistic model of conscious reality
   

   The theory that a good God's good Creation was invaded by a source consciousness with the opposite moral nature better accounts for the existence of evil than monism.

9. The failed argument from idealistic misidentification by differentiability
   

   Idealism's conflation of the undifferentiated unity of consciousness with the differentiated multiplicity of "experience" is in a weak and not a strict sense.

10. The failed argument from idealistic misidentification by affect and intentionality
    

    The concept of non-intentional and non-affective experiences is not strictly incoherent.