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The argument against Analytic Idealism from conflicting perspectives

This page is the distillation of an analytical journey laid out in previous pages in this series. It presents that argument against the idealism advanced by Bernardo Kastrup - which he now terms Analytic Idealism - in his book Why Materialism Is Baloney which I term the argument against Analytic Idealism from conflicting perspectives.

If you are interested in the journey leading up to this argument, then please feel free to click on "Contents" top or bottom of page, and explore it from there. The essence of the thinking out of which this argument evolved is presented on the previous page, so if you are interested in its genesis, then please refer to Return of the paradox - this time unresolved on that previous page.

Also, if this presentation is a bit too unwieldy for you, and you would prefer it in simpler, more direct and informal talk, then you might wish to refer first to the answers to the questions at the end of this page:

Too, a more direct argument has been presented by Titus Rivas, which you can read about below.

That said, I turn now directly to the argument itself, which runs as follows:

Informally:

Analytic Idealism is not an accurate model of reality because it entails a contradiction: it entails that a subject of experience experiences from multiple perspectives simultaneously, whereas essential to the nature of perspective is that it has a singular identity. More specifically, Analytic Idealism entails that the experiences had by animate experiences ("psyches", where by "animate" I mean that they themselves experience) are identical to those animate experiences as experiences themselves, and because those animate experiences are experienced simultaneously by mind at large in its role as the subject of experience which is the universal mind, then the universal mind experiences all of the perspectives of the subjects of the experiences had by those animate experiences simultaneously, which is impossible per the essential nature of perspective.

Semi-formally:

  1. The following premises of this argument are entailed by Analytic Idealism given the stipulated definition (1, premise).
  2. All experience has both a subjective and an objective aspect (2, premise).
  3. "Mental energy" is a synonym for "experience" encompassing both aspects, except that whereas "experience" emphasises the subjective aspect, "mental energy" emphasises the objective aspect (3, definition).
  4. Animate experiences exist which themselves experience (4, premise).
  5. The objective aspect (mental energy) of the experiences had by animate experiences is identical to the objective aspect (mental energy) of the animate experiences as experiences themselves (5, premise).
  6. If one experience has the same objective aspect as another, then it has the same subjective aspect as that other experience (6, premise).
  7. The subjective aspect of the experiences had by animate experiences is identical to the subjective aspect of those animate experiences as experiences themselves (7, inference from 4, 5, and 6).
  8. The subjective aspects of all animate experiences are experienced simultaneously by mind at large as a universal mind (8, premise).
  9. The subjective aspects of the experiences had by each animate experience are experienced simultaneously by mind at large as a universal mind (9, inference from 7 and 8).
  10. Essential to a subjective experience is the unique perspective of its subject of experience (10, premise).
  11. The subject of experience which is mind at large as a universal mind experiences from multiple unique perspectives simultaneously (11, inference from 9 and 10).
  12. Each subject of experience can only experience from a single unique perspective at once (12, premise).
  13. Analytic Idealism entails a contradiction (13, inference from 1, 11 and 12).
  14. That which entails a contradiction cannot be an accurate model of reality (14, premise).
  15. Analytic Idealism is not an accurate model of reality (15, conclusion from 13 and 14).

Below, I defend these numbered premises, definition, and inferences, and address other issues, by anticipating and answering a set of potential questions.

An explication and defence of one, premise: The following premises of this argument are entailed by Analytic Idealism given the stipulated definition

Q: Why are the following premises of the argument entailed by Analytic Idealism?

A: I defend this premise in specifics for each applicable premise below, justifying why it is either specifically entailed by Analytic Idealism or more generally true and thus entailed by all propositions, including those of Analytic Idealism.

An explication and defence of two, premise: All experience has both a subjective and an objective aspect

Q: How is the premise that all experience has both a subjective and an objective aspect entailed by Analytic Idealism?

A: Analytic Idealism entails that experience is both subjective in the sense of (from page 17 of the Kindle edition of Why Materialism Is Baloney) "the redness of red, the bitterness of regret, the warmth of fire" as well as objective in the sense of that which consists in the excitations, vibrations, mirrors, or protrusions of mind at large.

An explication and defence of three, premise: "Mental energy" is a synonym for "experience" encompassing both aspects, except that whereas "experience" emphasises the subjective aspect, "mental energy" emphasises the objective aspect

Q: Why use "mental energy" as a synonym for "experience" (as Bernardo uses that term) and why does it emphasise the objective aspect of experience?

A: Mental energy indubitably exists given the following argument, as presented on the previous page:

  1. That which is both differentiated and dynamic consists in energy of some type.
  2. Our experience consists in that which is differentiated and dynamic.
  3. Therefore, energy of some sort exists.
  4. Since the energy at issue is that which is experience, it must be of the type "mental".
  5. Therefore, mental energy exists.

On Analytic Idealism, because everything is in mind, mental energy, too, is in mind. "Energy" though connotes something objective, so that while it can meaningfully be used as a synonym for "experience" (in the sense in which Bernardo uses that term), it emphasises the objective aspect of the phenomenon - i.e., that of "mind in motion"; that which is excited, vibrated, mirrored, or protruded - rather than (whilst still encompassing) the subjective aspect - e.g., the redness of red..

An explication and defence of four, premise: Animate experiences exist which themselves experience

Q: How is the premise that animate experiences exist which themselves experience entailed by Analytic Idealism?

A: First, it is established on page 139 of the Kindle edition of Why Materialism is Baloney that on Analytic Idealism, everything is an experience:

[T]here is nothing to reality but the medium of mind itself. There exists nothing but the membrane.[...] When the membrane does vibrate, then experience arises. [...] [E]xperiences – the ‘contents’ of mind – are nothing but mind itself [...]

Then, Bernardo gives examples of both inanimate and animate experiences. On page 66 of the same book he writes that whilst "Idealism entails that all reality is in mind", and thus, that all reality - including rocks and chairs - is experience, "Idealism does not entail that rocks and chairs experience things subjectively the way you and I do".

Here, he contrasts the inanimate experiences which are rocks and chairs against those animate experiences which do themselves experience subjectively, such "you and I": "psyches", or, in other words, (human) brains or whatever fundamental experience of mind at large it is that underlies the external image of a (human) brain.

Now, it might be objected: no, Analytic Idealism does not entail that (animate) psyches are experienced by mind at large, because those psyches are dissociated from mind at large, and thus are in a sense "sectioned off" from the experiencing of mind at large.

In responding to this objection, I want to make use of an analogy, comparing mind at large to a chocolate chip cookie. The correspondences are as follows:

Now, in considering only the non-dissociated part of mind at large - the cookie dough - it might be possible for this objection to succeed, however, when considering mind at large in its entirety - the whole cookie - then it doesn't seem to succeed - and it seems valid to consider mind at large in its entirety given that the fundamental premise of Analytic Idealism is that reality is a singular conscious self.

Further: Analytic Idealism allows that the "experiences" of mind at large such as rocks and chairs, and of the external ("physical") world in general, appear to conform to those "physical" laws which have to an extent been discovered by science. It can only be mind at large, then, that confers (enforces?) these laws as part of its "experiencing" of (as) "the physical world". Too, on Analytic Idealism, dissociated identities are not exempted from being law-abiding in this way - that is, it isn't claimed that, e.g., human brains are a special case of "matter" which does not conform to the laws of physics. Bringing these two observations together: since dissociated identities (human brains in particular) present the same appearance of obeying the laws of physics that inanimate objects like rocks and chairs do, and since the laws of physics are conferred/enforced by mind at large via its "experiencing", then mind at large must be "experiencing" dissociated identities just as it experiences inanimate objects like rocks and chairs (so as to confer to those dissociated identities their law-abiding appearance).

An explication and defence of five, premise: The objective aspect of the experiences had by animate experiences is identical to the objective aspect of the animate experiences as experiences themselves

Q: How does Analytic Idealism entail the premise that the objective aspect (mental energy) of the experiences had by animate experiences is identical to the objective aspect (mental energy) of the animate experiences as experiences themselves?

A: It entails it given that Analytic Idealism is monistic, and thus that there is no duality between the subject of experience and experience; between the thinker and the thought; and thus the experiences had by a psyche at the same time are that psyche.

Another way of looking at this is that it seems that, on Bernardo's presentation, no new mental energy is created in the dissociation of a psyche; mental energy is only restructured (or protruded and vibrated, or whichever metaphor we prefer to use) in different ways. Thus, the mental energy which constitutes the experiences had by the experience which is the psyche (essentially, a brain) has nowhere to come from other than from that of the experience which is that psyche.

An explication and defence of six, premise: If one experience has the same objective aspect as another, then it has the same subjective aspect as that other experience

Q: How does Analytic Idealism entail that if one experience has the same objective aspect as another, then it has the same subjective aspect as that other experience?

A: This is entailed in that the subjective and objective aspects of experience are dual aspects of the same phenomenon, and thus to say that the one could vary independently of the other would be to violate the law of identity.

An explication and defence of seven, inference: The subjective aspect of the experiences had by animate experiences is identical to the subjective aspect of those animate experiences as experiences themselves

6, a premise, establishes that an experience having the same objective aspect as another entails it having the same subjective aspect as that other, and since 5, a premise, establishes that the experiences had by animate experiences have the same objective aspect as the animate experiences (as experiences) themselves, then the subjective aspect of the experiences had by animate experiences is the same as the subjective aspect of those animate experiences as experiences themselves.

An explication and defence of eight, premise: The subjective aspects of all animate experiences are experienced simultaneously by mind at large as a universal mind

Q: How does Analytic Idealism entail that the subjective aspects of all animate experiences are experienced simultaneously by mind at large as a universal mind?

A: It first entails that they are experienced by a universal mind in that there is necessarily a subject of experience, and since the subject of experience of animate experiences is not a psyche, then it must be the universal mind (note that, per the discussion of Titus Rivas's argument below, we are allowing that all "psyches" plus "the universal mind" constitute a set of distinct "pseudo" subjects, even though, on the monism of Analytic Idealism, there is strictly speaking only one subject). That the universal mind experiences these animate experiences simultaneously is a more general truth (that is, it is entailed in general, not just by Analytic Idealism) by the unity of (the subject of) experience: any subject of experience being unitary, then its experiences are, ultimately, unified, and thus any distinct experiences are experienced simultaneously. We can introspect this personally: though my current experiences of the keyboard and mouse in front of me are distinct, I nevertheless (and necessarily) experience them simultaneously.

An explication and defence of nine, inference: The subjective aspects of the experiences had by each animate experience are experienced simultaneously by mind at large as a universal mind

8, a premise, establishes that the subjective aspects of all animate experiences are experienced simultaneously by mind at large as a universal mind, and since 7, an inference, establishes that those subjective aspects are identical to the subjective aspect of the experiences had by animate experiences, then we can substitute in 8 the latter (the subjective aspects of the experiences had by animate experiences) for the former (the subjective aspects of animate experiences as experiences themselves) to arrive at this inference.

An explication and defence of ten, premise: Essential to a subjective experience is the unique perspective of its subject of experience

Q: How does Analytic Idealism entail that essential to a subjective experience is the unique perspective of its subject of experience?

A: This entailment is true generally and is thus entailed by every proposition, not just by the propositions of Analytic Idealism. It is a semantic entailment of the meaning of "experience" in the subjective sense: the very meaning of "subjective" experience entails a subject of experience, and a subject entails a unique perspective from which that subject "peers out and pokes" at reality.

An explication and defence of eleven, inference: The subject of experience which is mind at large as a universal mind experiences from multiple unique perspectives simultaneously

9, an inference, establishes that mind at large as a universal mind simultaneously experiences the subjective experiences had by multiple animate experiences, and since 10, a premise, establishes that essential to each of those subjective experiences is a unique perspective, then it follows that mind at large as a universal mind simultaneously experiences from each unique perspective which corresponds to each of those subjective experiences.

An explication and defence of twelve, premise: Each subject of experience can only experience from a single unique perspective at once

Q: How does Analytic Idealism entail that each subject of experience can only experience from a single unique perspective at once?

A: This entailment is true generally and is thus entailed by every proposition, not just by the propositions of Analytic Idealism. This, again, is a semantic entailment of the meaning of "perspective" based in the law of identity: a perspective has an identity, and whilst it is possible for a subject of experience to think about and imagine itself in other perspectives than the one in which it is, it is not possible for it to simultaneously be in a perspective other than the one in which it is.

An explication and defence of thirteen, inference: Analytic Idealism entails a contradiction

Per 12, a premise, each subject of experience can only experience from a single unique perspective at once, but per 11, an inference, the subject of experience which is mind at large does not do this; instead, it experiences from multiple perspectives at once, contradicting the premise of 12. Since 11 is the outcome of a chain of inferences from premises which, per 1, a premise, are entailed by Analytic Idealism, then it is Analytic Idealism which entails this contradiction.

An explication and defence of fourteen, premise: That which entails a contradiction cannot be an accurate model of reality

Q: Why can that which entails a contradiction not be an accurate model of reality?

A: Because a contradiction entails falsity, and accurate models of reality are not false.

An explication and defence of fifteen, inference: Analytic Idealism is not an accurate model of reality

This inference follows simply from its premises and requires no defence.

Miscellaneous questions and answers

Q: The argument is long and detailed. Can you put it simply?

A: Sure. The gist of the argument is that if we are all experiences of the universal mind, then the subjective perspective of the universal mind must be identical to each of our subjective perspectives - but this is clearly impossible, because it can only be identical to a single perspective, not multiple (and so, because it leads to something impossible, Analytic Idealism can't be right). The argument as framed above simply fleshes out in rigorous detail why this follows.

Q: OK, so how does the argument flesh out why an impossibility follows?

A: Well, psyches - that is, persons such as humans and animals - have experiences. But at the same time they are experiences - experiences of the universal mind. And because the mental energy which comprises the experiences that they have is the same mental energy which comprises themselves as an experience (of the universal mind), then the two experiences must be the same: both the experiences had by the psyche (its experience of the redness of red, etc) and the experience of the universal mind which is the psyche (which for human psyches has, from the outside perspective, the image of a brain). And since the experiences had by the psyche come from a unique perspective, then those same experiences (of the universal mind) as the psyche must also come from that same unique perspective. The problem is that the universal mind is experiencing multiple psyches simultaneously - and they can't all be its experience from a unique perspective, because the perspectives conflict, e.g., the redness of red is perceived by one psyche from its perspective in the top left of its field of vision, whereas another psyche perceives the blueness of blue from its perspective in the top left field of its vision. So, when we think about what follows from the premises of Analytic Idealism, we find that it leads to an impossible conclusion - and, therefore, it can't be right.

Q: Does this argument get at the root of the problem with Analytic Idealism?

A: Not quite. I think that the root of it is as all-too-briefly identified on the previous page, in the first sentence and a half in the first paragraph under the heading Problems and paradoxes:

You might sense the problem I have with this model immediately given that description. There is only one mind, yet at the same time there are multiple persons

In this respect, I think that Analytic Idealism is a case of having one's cake and eating it too. The having of one's cake is the simplicity of solipsism: there is only one mind; we do not need to postulate anything beyond that. The eating it too is: actually, there are also other personal minds beyond mine - but we'll call them "psyches" of the one mind rather than separate minds. This, I think, is the root problem with Analytic Idealism which the argument of this page clarifies in an indirect way.

Q: OK, so, you think that Analytic Idealism is incoherent. How, then, would you fix it minimally so that it was coherent?

A: I would do one of two things:

Q: You write that this argument is indirect. Is there, then, a more direct argument?

A: Yes. Titus Rivas makes a more direct argument - on which for more, see below. Too, after completing this argument, I realised that its form could be adjusted slightly such that it is more direct: rather than its conclusion being based in a conflict between the multiple perspectives of the animate experiences (psyches) (each perspective of which the perspective of the universal mind is identified with), it would instead be based in a conflict between the perspective of any given animate experience and the perspective of the universal mind itself. This would be a superior form for two reasons:

  1. It would not require more than a single animate experience (psyche) of the universal mind to exist.
  2. It would more directly get at the root of the problem: that if only one mind exists, then it does not make sense to say that any psyche also exists ("within" it), because the one mind would then necessarily take on the unique perspective of that "inner" psyche, whereas it has its own unique perspective already.

For the argument to work, though, would require that the universal mind have at least some experiences other than the animate experience in question - at least either one other animate experience or one other inanimate experience. This is because otherwise it could be objected that the universal mind simply is (identical to) the animate experience, because that is all its experience consists in (i.e., solipsism), and therefore that there is no distinct perspective of the universal mind with which to conflict: the perspective of the universal mind would simply be (identical to) the perspective of its singular animate experience (again: solipsism).

The construction of this argument is left as an exercise for the reader, although if anybody really wants me to construct it for them, then I may be willing to oblige.

Q: Has anybody else made related arguments?

A: Yes. Titus Rivas made a related but more direct argument on his page Is noetic monism tenable? which he published on November 11th 2017. Curiously, Titus had shared that page with me in the weeks prior to my arriving "independently" at "my" argument, yet, until he reminded me of it, I had not realised how similar in form it was to "my" argument. I genuinely did arrive at my argument via the process of thinking through the four paradoxes listed on the page prior to this one, An analysis of Bernardo Kastrup's semantic model of idealism, but who knows whether, having already been exposed to Titus's argument, a subconscious teleology was in operation whereby I was led in the right direction. It seems entirely plausible, in which case this page might be seen as "independent verification via teleological guidance" of Titus's argumentation.

Titus's argument is more direct because it is based in the more assertive case that if one self is the same as another, then the two perspectives and sets of phenomenal experiences of those two selves must also be the same (whereas under Analytic Idealism, and noetic monism more generally, they are not, and hence both Analytic Idealism and noetic monism more generally are false). My argument, on the other hand, allows that although any two selves are on Analytic Idealism ultimately the same (given that there is only one subject of experience), the perspective and phenomenal experiences of one (e.g., an animate experience, aka a psyche) might coherently be different than those of another (e.g., another animate experience aka another psyche).

My argument might be said, then, to allow for the existence of "pseudo" selves (the set of all animate experiences aka psyches plus the universal mind), which, although ultimately identical, can nevertheless coherently appear to be and function as if different from one another, in the sense of having different perspectives and streams of phenomenal consciousness. As opposed to Titus's more direct argument, then, mine is based in the case that a pseudo self cannot experience from multiple conflicting perspectives simultaneously (whereas under Analytic Idealism, the pseudo self which is the universal mind does experience from multiple conflicting perspectives simultaneously, and hence Analytic Idealism is false).

Having discussed this in personal correspondence with Titus, I have come to the view that his more direct argument very probably is sound: that even a "pseudo" self cannot coherently have a different perspective and/or stream of phenomenal consciousness than another "pseudo" self if their actual selves are identical; if in reality there really is only one Self.

Where does this leave my argument of this page then? As a backstop. It can be seen to be the fallback argument against a committed Analytic Idealist who cannot or simply does not accept the stronger claim per Titus's argument that no two selves, if ultimately identical, can coherently have different perspectives or different streams of phenomenal consciousness. To such a committed Analytic Idealist, one can then say, "OK, even granting that individual psyches, though they ultimately have the same self, can, as 'pseudo' selves, coherently have different perspectives and streams of phenomenal consciousness, it is still the case that one such 'pseudo' self - the universal mind - is incoherently experiencing from multiple conflicting perspectives, and thus, even then, Analytic Idealism is false".

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