The failed argument from idealistic misidentification by affect and intentionality

The argument against idealism presented on this page is a failed one. I publish it only because it was an instructive step on the journey towards the (in my view) successful argument against idealism at which I eventually did arrive: The argument against idealism from conflicting perspectives. You can read more about my journey towards that argument by clicking "Contents" at the middle top or bottom of this page. This argument was composed prior to my work on clear semantic modelling, and its failure - along with that of my other failed argument against idealism, the failed argument from idealistic misidentification by differentiability - was the impetus for me to undertake that work.

Why does this argument fail? In short, because there is nothing strictly incoherent about non-intentional and non-affective experiences, as acknowledged (rather grudgingly at the time!) in the answer to the question below regarding all experiences being identical in the sense of all of them being "excitations of the medium of mind".

This page is of historical interest too because it represents the evolution of my eventual concept of that which I refer to as the axis of selfhood, according to which I identify more with those of my experiences which are more terminal and less representative than I do with those of my experiences which are more representative and less terminal. In terms of that concept at which I eventually arrived, on this historical page I sometimes confused "affect" with terminality - the latter being a term at which I had not yet arrived.

It is also of interest because it contains a useful argument as to the necessity of terminating experiences in empirical reality. That argument is elaborated in the four consecutive questions starting from What do I mean by the experienced empirical world being non-intentional? (where for that which I referred to as "non-intentional" there I would now use "terminal", and where I used there "intentional", I would now use "representative").

Because my exposure to idealism is primarily through the writings of Bernardo Kastrup, and, of those, primarily his book Why Materialism Is Baloney, this page is biased towards, and to some extent assumes, Bernardo's framing of idealism: where I write of that which is entailed by idealism, I sometimes mean "as framed by Bernardo".

The failed argument from idealistic misidentification by differentiability then is:

Idealism is false because it is contradictory: it identifies that which is intentional or affective with that which is non-intentional and non-affective. More specifically, it entails that experience, which is intentional or affective, has the same ontological nature as the experienced empirical world, which is non-intentional and non-affective. The quality of being intentional or affective is opposite to the quality of being non-intentional and non-affective, and that the ontological nature of which has the one quality cannot be identical with that the ontological nature of which has the other, yet idealism entails that the ontological natures of experience and the experienced empirical world, which each have one of these opposing qualities, are identical, and thus entails a contradiction.

Semi-formally:

1. The ontological nature of experience is defined by having one of the essential qualities of either intentionality or affect (1, premise).
2. The ontological nature of the experienced empirical world includes neither of the qualities of intentionality nor affect (2, premise).
3. Idealism entails that the ontological natures of experience and the experienced empirical world are identical (3, premise).
4. Idealism entails that an ontological nature including the qualities of either intentionality or affect is identical to an ontological nature including neither the qualities of intentionality nor affect (4 from 1, 2 and 3).
5. An ontological nature including the qualities of either intentionality or affect cannot be identical to an ontological nature including neither the qualities of intentionality nor affect (5, premise).
6. Idealism entails a contradiction (6 from 4 and 5).
7. Idealism is false (7 from 6).

Below, I defend these numbered premises and inferences, and address other issues, by anticipating and answering a set of potential questions.

An explication and defence of premise one: The ontological nature of experience is defined by having one of the essential qualities of either intentionality or affect

Q: What do I mean by experience being intentional or affective?

A: I mean that the intrinsic nature of experience (as we know it personally and subjectively) is to either represent or to feel. That which is neither intentional nor affective - neither representative nor feeling - does not qualify as experience; it is something else. To be intentional in this sense is to be "of" or "about". This is the case for both sensory and cognitive experiences. My sensory experiences are perceptions "of" the empirical world, whether that be of the way that the empirical world looks, sounds, tastes, smells, or feels, or of any other quality of that world. They represent the empirical world. My cognitive experiences are thoughts "about" the empirical or conceptual worlds. They represent the empirical or conceptual worlds. Affective experiences (emotions and feelings) are not intentional: to the extent that they can be said to represent anything at all, they are self-representative only. Although I might be happy about something that happened, that "aboutness" is not representational but referential; it "links to" rather than "reproduces". Too, I might anyway just as well be happy about nothing in particular.

Q: But how do I know that (sensory) experiences are intentional? Couldn't they be ends in themselves?

A: The position that (sensory) experiences are non-intentional and are ends in themselves is solipsism. Solipsism is probably false in that if it were true, I would probably have no limitations on the exercise of my will, nor experiences of that with which I do not consciously identify, but neither of these are the case. In any case, if solipsism is true, then in some sense you (as the reader) wrote this answer yourself, not me, in which case: try to figure out why you (as "me") are arguing that solipsism is probably false when it is in fact true...

Q: But is experience necessarily intentional or affective? In other words, should these qualities be crucial to its definition?

A: At the least, I can say that intentional and affective experiences are the only type of experiences that I have. I presume that this is the same for all other people, and, indeed, all sentient life on this planet. The argument would still work if this premise were adjusted such that, rather than experience in general being defined as either intentional or affective, only personal experience was. This personal experience would then, as experience in general is in the argument as it stands, be contrasted in premise three against whatever is the ontological nature of the experienced world per premise two, allowing that this might itself be a non-affective, non-volitional, and thus non-personal "experience" of some type.

An explication and defence of premise two: The ontological nature of the experienced empirical world includes neither the qualities of intentionality nor affect

Q: What do I mean by the experienced empirical world being non-intentional?

A: I mean that its intrinsic nature is to be an end in itself. It is that in which the intentionality of experience terminates. For example, a tree does not refer to anything. A tree just is. When I look at a tree, I have an experience of the tree, which terminates in the tree.

Q: But how do I know that the experienced empirical world is non-intentional? Surely it is possible that it has a referent?

A: Whilst it is possible that the experienced empirical world is intentional in some way of which we are unaware, that chain of intentionality has to terminate somewhere, unless it is circular. If it terminates somewhere, then that in which it terminates is non-intentional, and an ontological duality is anyway affirmed. If it were circular, then our sensory experiences would be indeterminate, but they are not.

Q: But would a circularity inevitably lead to indeterminacy? Is it possible instead that an intentional experience represents another intentional experience without in turn representing that which the second intentional experience itself represents, but rather representing something about that intentional experience as an intentional experience, such that there is something determinate to represent?

A: That depends on the degree of that which, for want of a known term of art, I term here "transference". The inherent nature of that which an intentional experience represents is transferred more, or less, directly to the representation. Idealism entails that for the type of experiences at issue - sensory perceptions of the empirical world - the degree of transference is high if not complete, given that they are by the premise of idealism exactly the same type of ontological reality as that which is representing them. Thus, indeterminacy is inevitable on circularity.

Q: But why would a circle of high-transference intentional experiences lead to indeterminacy?

A: I illustrate with a circle of two in which experience A is representing experience B, and experience B is representing experience A. In this case, experience A is determined by experience B and is otherwise indeterminate, and experience B is determined by experience A and is otherwise indeterminate. In this case, both experiences are "otherwise" - thus indeterminate - because there is nothing independent in either experience by which to determine (in which to ground) the other.

Q: What do I mean by the experienced empirical world being non-affective?

A: I mean that there is no emotion or feeling as the experienced empirical world.

Q: But how do I know that the experienced empirical world is non-affective? Why is it impossible that it is an emotion or feeling?

A: It is impossible because affective states are undifferentiated, whereas the experienced empirical world is differentiated.

Q: But how do I know that affective states are undifferentiated?

A: I do not strictly know that affective states are undifferentiated, but I can give good reasons as to why I believe that they are. Those reasons start with the observation that affective states are essential to the subjectivity of consciousness, which itself is undifferentiated. Whilst it is possible to imagine being conscious with neither sensory perceptions nor cognition (thoughts), it is not possible to imagine being conscious without being in an affective state, even if that state is one of "numbness" or "meaninglessness". My understanding (not, strictly, though, knowledge) is that affective states, like colours, can be closer or further from other affective states (colours), and can be a mixture of shades, but, like a colour, the outcome of the mixture of affective shades is an undifferentiated state.

Q: So, are you saying that there is no affective or intentional experience as the empirical world whatsoever?

A: No, my argument is only that there is no affective or intentional experience as the experienced empirical world; my argument allows that the empirical world beyond that which we experience of it could be an affective or intentional experience.

An explication and defence of premise three: Idealism entails that the ontological natures of experience and the experienced empirical world are identical

Q: What do I mean by idealism entailing that the ontological natures of experience and the experienced empirical world are identical?

A: I mean that idealism does not distinguish ontologically between personal experience and that which is personally experienced as the empirical world, which itself is an "experience" of mind-at-large.

An explication and defence of inference four: Idealism entails that an ontological nature including the qualities of either intentionality or affect is identical to an ontological nature including neither the qualities of intentionality nor affect

This inference simply follows from its premises and requires no defence.

An explication and defence of premise five: An ontological nature including the qualities of either intentionality or affect cannot be identical to an ontological nature including neither the qualities of intentionality nor affect

Q: Why can't an ontological nature including the qualities of either intentionality or affect be identical to an ontological nature including neither the qualities of intentionality nor affect?

A: Because the qualities of intentionality and affect are ontologically basic.

Q: Even though experience is different from experienced empirical reality in that the qualities of one contradict the qualities of the other, couldn't they still be the same in the sense of both being experiences as defined by "excitations of the medium of mind"?

A: This would entail that the "excitations of the medium of mind" are experiences which are neither intentional nor affective, and thus, per the above, are non-personal experiences. It is an open question as to whether or not it is meaningful to talk about "experiences" which are both non-intentional and non-affective, or, in other words, about "non-personal experiences". My provisional view is that it is not, but I am open to proposals that it is, and to what it might mean.

Q: If the concept of "non-personal experiences" was meaningful, then would this premise be false, and if so, what would the implications be for the argument as a whole?

A: It would in that case be possible to argue that that would make this premise false if one were to argue simultaneously that intentionality and affect, whilst ontologically basic, are not basic to the definition of experience itself, and thus that the two ontological natures of personal experience and non-personal experience can be identical at the level of "experience in general". The argument then would no longer be sound.

Q: Given that the concept of "non-personal experiences" could invalidate the argument, could any alternative argument in that case be mounted?

A: Yes, one could instead argue - though it would not be as strong an argument - that the ontological natures of personal experience and empirical reality are anyway so different as to weaken the argument for idealism from parsimony to the point that it is no longer effective. That argument, roughly, is premised on the idea that it is unparsimonious to propose a world beyond consciousness when we don't need to. However, if the world in consciousness would itself be - as has been argued above - radically different from personal consciousness as we know it, then the two scenarios (the empirical world being "in" and "beyond" consciousness) are not sufficiently distinguished - both are radically different from that which we know of conscious experience - as to make the one sufficiently more parsimonious than the other as to justify an idealist ontology on that basis (parsimony) alone.

An explication and defence of inference six: Idealism entails a contradiction

This inference simply follows from its premises and requires no defence.

An explication and defence of inference seven: Idealism is false

This inference simply follows from its premises and requires no defence.