The failed argument from idealistic misidentification by differentiability
The argument against idealism presented on this page is a failed one. I publish it only because it was an instructive step on the journey towards the (in my view) successful argument against idealism at which I eventually did arrive: The argument against idealism from conflicting perspectives. You can read more about my journey towards that argument by clicking "Contents" at the middle top or bottom of this page. This argument was composed prior to my work on clear semantic modelling, and its failure - along with that of my other failed argument against idealism, the failed argument from idealistic misidentification by affect and intentionality - was the impetus for me to undertake that work.
Why does this argument fail? In short, because of the answer to the question below regarding strict versus weak identity.
This page is of historical interest too because in it can be seen the genesis of some of the concepts expressed in my mostly grounded clear semantic model of conscious reality: in particular, that consciousness is an undifferentiated unity whereas experience is a differentiated multiplicity. I have, though, realised since then that the former concept is not quite right: it is not consciousness which is an undifferentiated unity, but the subject of consciousness, although it does make sense to use "a" consciousness as a synonym for a subject of consciousness. I have not amended this historical page to correct any errors related to that potential misuse of terms.
It is also of interest because it contains useful comments on "non-conscious consciousness" and how that incoherence might be resolved.
Because my exposure to idealism is primarily through the writings of Bernardo Kastrup, and, of those, primarily his book Why Materialism Is Baloney, this page is biased towards, and to some extent assumes, Bernardo's framing of idealism: where I write of that which is entailed by idealism, I sometimes mean "as framed by Bernardo".
The failed argument from idealistic misidentification by affect and intentionality then is:
Idealism is false because it is contradictory: it identifies the singular with the plural. More specifically, it identifies consciousness, which is unitary, with the "experiences" of that consciousness, which are a multiplicity. The singular and the plural are, however, fundamentally distinct, and cannot be identical on pain of contradiction, yet idealism asserts their identity anyway, and thus entails a contradiction.
- Consciousness is an undifferentiated unity (1, premise).
- "Experience" is a differentiated multiplicity (2, premise).
- Idealism entails that consciousness and "experience" are identical (3, premise).
- Idealism entails that an undifferentiated unity is identical to a differentiated multiplicity (4 from 1, 2 and 3).
- An undifferentiated unity cannot be identical to a differentiated multiplicity (5, premise).
- Idealism entails a contradiction (6 from 4 and 5).
- Idealism is false (7 from 6).
Below, I defend these numbered premises and inferences, and address other issues, by anticipating and answering a set of potential questions.
An explication and defence of premise one: Consciousness is an undifferentiated unity
Q: What do I mean by consciousness being an undifferentiated unity?
A: I mean that both momentarily and across time it is singular and cannot be split into parts.
We can each say "I am conscious", which indicates an individual, undifferentiated subject of consciousness. If one of us is to say "I am conscious" later, he or she is referring to the same individual, undifferentiated subject of consciousness to which he or she referred earlier when saying the same thing.
Q: I just asserted that the subject of consciousness is an undifferentiated unity, but is consciousness itself an undifferentiated unity?
A: Yes: in this sense, the subject of consciousness is consciousness itself. We refer to "subjective" consciousness to indicate that consciousness is defined by its subjectivity. Granted, we might also refer to "experiential" consciousness, but by that we mean that the nature of subjective consciousness is to experience. If we take the existence of both of the terms "subjective consciousness" and "experiential consciousness" to mean that subjective consciousness is experience, then we are engaging in the same mistaken conflation associated with the contradiction in idealism which this argument is premised upon.
Q: But isn't the subject of consciousness merely an abstraction like the number one?
A: The subject of consciousness can be spoken of abstractly, but it can also be instantiated as (a) consciousness, just as the number one can be spoken of abstractly, but can also be instantiated in reality, as when we count a single object.
Q: But how do I know that consciousness is undifferentiated? Surely it is possible that consciousness has parts to it?
A: Whilst it is possible that consciousness - in particular the conscious soul - has differentiated parts, it is always possible at least conceptually to strip those parts back until we are left with the raw actualised capacity for experience and volition from a subjective perspective - and it is this - at a minimum conceptual - entity to which I refer when I assert that consciousness is undifferentiated.
Q: Does this premise beg the question though? Would a person who starts with the conviction that consciousness is identical to experience or "experience" really accept the claim that consciousness is an undifferentiated unity?
A: I think that I have given good enough reasons why we should accept the claim that consciousness is an undifferentiated unity for this premise (and the argument as a whole) not to beg the question. It is possible, though, that, as I wrote in footnote #4 of my original review, this is in part a semantic issue. I do not think, though, that it is. Meanings can only be extended so far in shared conversation lest nobody be able to understand anybody else, and I think that I do understand what Bernardo means well enough to argue against it.
An explication and defence of premise two: "Experience" is a differentiated multiplicity
Q: What do I mean by the "experiences" of consciousness being a differentiated multiplicity?
A: I mean that both momentarily and across time they are divisible into parts. One type of experience is especially relevant: those experiences of mind-at-large (Bernardo's term for the universal consciousness) which constitute the "whirlpool" which gives rise to an "alter" (Bernardo's term for personal, individuated consciousnesses) in the first place. These "experiences" of mind-at-large are, roughly speaking, the neurons of the brain or whatever fundamental "experience" it is that underlies those neurons. Each neuron in the brain is, obviously, differentiated from the rest.
Across time, these differentiated experiences are themselves differentiated by change: as thoughts occur, one set of neurons firing gives rise to another.
An explication and defence of premise three: Idealism entails that consciousness and "experience" are identical
Q: What, then, do I mean by idealism entailing that consciousness and "experience" are identical?
A: I mean that the undifferentiated, unitary consciousness of each alter is identified as a differentiated multiplicity of "experiences" of mind-at-large - namely, the differentiated neurons of the alter's brain. Now, there is no contradiction in saying that unitary consciousness is associated with a multiplicity of "experiences" (those neurons which constitute its brain), but to say that it is identical to that multiplicity is incoherent.
Q: But does idealism actually entail this identity?
A: Yes, it does, in that according to idealism, everything is mind, which is synonymous with consciousness. Experiences are just "mind in motion", and thus are conflated with mind (consciousness). The "experiences" which are neurons are thus conceived as being one and the same as the consciousness which is the alter.
Q: But is this really an identification in a strong sense or could it be in a weaker sense which does not necessarily imply strict equivalence? For example, I could say that I "am" my body without meaning to strictly identify my body and the essential self which is my consciousness. Couldn't idealism similarly entail that I "am" those "experiences" of mind-at-large which are the neurons of my brain without intending to strictly identify those "experiences" with my (unitary) consciousness?
A: After consideration, I have come to the conclusion that yes, the identification could be in a weaker sense which does not necessarily imply strict equivalence, and thus that this premise could be false, and thus that the argument as a whole is unsound. I had been reluctant to accept this conclusion given that I intuited that in some sense, idealism is incoherent, and since at the time of first writing, I had no better argument, I wanted this one to work. I did, though, eventually have to accept this conclusion, and, before arriving at my ultimate argument against idealism, was temporarily of the view that it was coherent. That consists in at least some sort of intellectual integrity, I hope. Here is what I had originally written as the answer to this question when I was still trying to make the argument work:
It is possible to make that weaker identification, however, idealism does seem to entail the strict identity, in that, according to idealism, there is no consciousness in the absence of motion/vibration/excitation, and the only plausible candidates for that motion/vibration/excitation are the neurons of the brain, such that there is no alternative to identifying the alter's (unitary) consciousness strictly as those (multiplicity of) neurons. Again, though, as per footnote #4 of my original review, this could be a partly semantic issue.
An explication and defence of inference four: Idealism entails that an undifferentiated unity is identical to a differentiated multiplicity
This inference simply follows from its premises and requires no defence.
An explication and defence of premise five: An undifferentiated unity cannot be identical to a differentiated multiplicity
Q: Why can't an undifferentiated unity be identical to a differentiated multiplicity?
A: Because the qualities of differentiability and plurality are ontologically basic.
Q: But don't we talk about "conscious experiences", and doesn't this imply that experiences are conscious and thus are identical with consciousness, and that there is nothing incoherent about this identification?
A: To say that an experience is conscious is not to say that the experience is consciousness; it is to say that the experience "occurs to" or "is had by" consciousness; in other words, that the experience is in some intimate sense associated with consciousness..
Q: But aren't consciousness and experience at least the same category of being?
A: They are similar categories yet distinct. Consciousness is neither abstract nor concrete; it is of a peculiar category of its own (Bernardo kind of gets at this in the quote below in saying that "the medium of mind" is a "potential" only). Experiences, because differentiated, are more concrete than consciousness is: to be differentiated is to have structure and thus to be substantive in some sense, and this sense of substantiveness combined with tangibility - experiences are tangible to/in/of our consciousness - is what I mean by "more concrete". Consciousness itself is not so much tangible to us as it is accessible and inferable. These three words ("tangible", "accessible", and "inferable") are unfortunately not precise, but they are the best that I have thought of.
Q: Above, I acknowledged that consciousness might only be undifferentiated after conceptually stripping it back - if this were the case, would it avoid the contradiction? The contradiction, after all, seems to be predicated on a real distinction and not a merely conceptual one.
A: It might be arguable that this would avoid the contradiction as stated in terms of unity versus multiplicity, however, and regardless, the conceptual stripping back at the least demonstrates that an unavoidable ontological duality exists between consciousness as minimally conceived and its experiences, and so in any case idealism is premised on a mistaken conflation.
Q: I acknowledged in footnote #4 of my initial review that Bernardo recognises and attempts to reconcile a duality - what is wrong with that reconciliation?
A: Yes, he does recognise and attempt to reconcile a duality, on page 152 of Why Materialism Is Baloney (Kindle edition), where he writes (emphasis in the original):
The main thrust of this book has been the claim that only experience exists. Yet, I am postulating a metaphorical ‘medium of mind’ – visualized in the form of a water stream, or an ocean of mercury, or a tinfoil membrane – from which experience ultimately originates. As such, it is fair to state that the medium of mind itself is not an experience. But wait…isn’t experience all that exists? A contradiction seems to arise. Let’s attempt to elucidate this somewhat.
All we can ever know to exist is experience, so let us stick to our original conclusion: there is only experience, as far as we can know. Now, since experience is modeled as the movement of the medium of mind, the necessary consequence is that the medium of mind itself must be empty – a void – in the sense that it fundamentally transcends all experience and knowledge.
[...]
So, on the one hand, it is entirely valid to say that only experience exists, for the medium of mind is merely a potential, not an actuality. It concretizes into existence only when it moves and, at that point, it is nothing but the corresponding experiences. On the other hand, it is also entirely valid to talk metaphorically about a ‘medium of mind,’ insofar as this is a reference to a potential, not an actuality. In doing so, I am trying to convey a metaphorical image by means of which one can visualize this potential.
Here, Bernardo recognises a distinction between "the medium of mind" and "experience". But since he defines "experience" and "consciousness" as synonyms (at least effectively - "experience" is "mind in motion" where "mind" is synonymous with "consciousness"), we can't say that what he means by "the medium of mind" is "consciousness as distinct from experience", though he seems to be saying that it is the potential for consciousness (as conflated with "experience"). What he doesn't seem to acknowledge is that in asserting that when it moves, the medium of mind "is nothing but the corresponding experiences" he is conflating consciousness and "experience", and, in so doing, identifies an undifferentiated unity - consciousness - with a differentiated multiplicity - "experience". He thus fails to reconcile this contradiction.
Q: Does Bernardo preempt and defuse this argument as being non-analogous to an anti-materialist argument in Why Materialism Is Baloney in the section introducing the whirlpool metaphor?
A: No. Here is what Bernardo writes in that section on page 83 (Kindle edition; emphasis in the original):
[W]hen I say that the brain is like a whirlpool in the stream of mind, I am implying a correspondence – a mapping – between the qualities of subjective experience and the patterns of flow within this whirlpool. If an active brain is merely a partial image of these patterns of flow, the implication may sound entirely analogous to the materialist position that experience must map one-to-one onto measurable parameters of brain processes. Yet, in Chapter 2, I argued precisely that this mapping, while being superficially there in the form of high-level neural correlates of consciousness, breaks down when we look more carefully into the details and circumstances. Therefore, one may think that my argument in Chapter 2 defeats the whirlpool metaphor just as much as it defeats materialism. This is not so for at least two reasons.
The first reason is the following: materialism inverts the situation by taking the image of the phenomenon – that is, the brain – to be primary, to be the source of the phenomenon, instead of one of its results. The peculiar consequence of this inversion is that, for materialists, there cannot be anything to the phenomenon of experience other than what can be seen in its image. In other words, the mapping between experiences and neural processes has to be complete and unambiguous, for neural processes aren’t seen as mere images, but as the very source of experience.
And then on page 87:
The second reason why my argument in Chapter 2 does not defeat the whirlpool metaphor is this: it is true that the metaphor, like materialism, entails a strong correlation between the qualities of experience and parameters of neural processes, but only under ordinary – that is, highly localized – states of consciousness. In other words, when the consciousness of a subject is well-localized and the brain is operating regularly, the whirlpool metaphor does require some correspondence between mind states and brain states – albeit, as argued above, not as much or as strictly as materialism. However, unlike materialism, the whirlpool metaphor predicts that this correspondence breaks upon a partial or temporary de-localization of consciousness caused by reduction of brain function.
Here, Bernardo addresses concerns with respect to any correspondence between outer and inner experiences; in other words, between the outer "experiences" of mind-at-large which are the "whirlpool" (basically: the brain, or whatever underlies the brain-as-image), and the inner experiences of the alter which is that whirlpool. He does not, though, address concerns about identifying either or both of those sets of experiences or "experiences" as that unitary consciousness which is the alter.
Too, neither of the reasons he offers in response to those concerns are applicable to my argument anyway, in the first place because I have not asserted nor even suggested that on Bernardo's idealism, the brain is assumed to be primary - instead I have noted that on Bernardo's idealism the brain is (necessarily) identified as consciousness - and in the second, because I have not assumed any particular strength of correspondences between inner and outer experiences or "experiences" either.
An explication and defence of inference six: Idealism entails a contradiction
This inference simply follows from its premises and requires no defence.
An explication and defence of inference seven: Idealism is false
This inference simply follows from its premises and requires no defence.
Miscellaneous questions, answers, objections, and responses.
Q: Is this argument analogous to an argument against materialism though?
A: Yes, it is analogous to an argument that can be made against identity theory (the monistic physicalist theory that consciousness simply is the brain): that argument runs, similarly, that consciousness cannot be identical to the brain because the brain is a multiplicity of physical neurons whereas consciousness is a unitary, mental phenomenon.
Q: In my initial review of Bernardo's book, I suggested that idealism as Bernardo articulates it entails "non-conscious consciousness". Is that relevant here?
A: Yes, it is. Consciousness is characterised by being conscious. Consciousness which is not conscious is a contradiction in terms. This, though, is what is entailed by an idealism which stipulates that entities such as tables and chairs are non-conscious, for those entities are at the same time consciousness, because all that exists is consciousness. This demonstrates the distinction between consciousness and "experience": whilst consciousness must be conscious, "experience" need not be.
Q: Could we fix the incoherence of "non-conscious consciousness" by stipulating not just that "everything is consciousness", but also that "everything is conscious", and would this avoid the need to make a distinction between consciousness and "experience"?
A: We could stipulate that, and it would fix the incoherence. In doing so, we would note that the position that Bernardo presents in Why Materialism Is Baloney is that there is only one, universal, subject of consciousness. The situation we would be stipulating, then, is one in which the universal subject of consciousness "peers out" from every set of "experiences": from a single sub-atomic particle, from an atom, from a molecule, a cell, a body, a brain, a table, a chair, a chair leg, a crumb, a wire, a piece of the ocean with randomly selected boundaries, a portion of dirt with randomly selected boundaries, Africa, Sydney, the planet Earth, the Milky Way Galaxy, etc. We would not, in doing so, though, avoid the distinction between "that which peers out" and "that from which it peers out", or, in other words, between consciousness and "experience".
We would also notice something interesting: our personal, inner experiences, too, would be conscious, since idealism makes no ontological distinction between inner experience and outer "experience". The universal subject of consciousness would thus be "peering out" from not just the "experience" which is our brain, but from our inner experiences of hearing an individual musical note and of the song within which that note is played; from our anger; from our experience of conceiving of the argument presented on this page; from our feelings and thoughts in general. This is a strange and, arguably, incoherent notion. Is a personal experience the sort of thing that can be conscious? It seems unlikely.
